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Volatility in exchange rates is a prominent feature of open economies,  a fact which has 
motivated elaborate attempts in many countries at exchange rate management. This paper 
analyzes quantitatively the welfare effects of exchange rate risk in a general two-country 
environment. It finds that the effects of uncertainty tend to be small for the types of 
simplified cases considered in past literature. But it identifies other cases, not considered 
previously, in which  these effects can be significantly larger.  These include habit 
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members of the euro zone, may accrue significant benefits because of the enhanced ability 
to hedge against exchange rate risk.  
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comments.  1 Introduction
Exchange rate variability is one of the most prominent features of open economy macroeconomics,
and the tendency for nominal exchange rates to move so volatilely and unpredictably has been
blamed for limiting gains from international trade and for lowering welfare. A desire to moderate
this uncertainty has been a motivation behind the managed exchange rate regimes of many countries,
and recently of the monetary union in Europe. This paper conducts a quantitative examination of the
welfare effects of risk in the context of a two-country general equilibrium model with sticky prices.
In Mundell’s pioneering work on optimal currency areas which in large part earned him a Nobel
prize in 1999, he emphasized a trade-off between the costs and beneﬁts of exchange rate ﬂexibility.
On one hand, signiﬁcant advances have been made regarding one of the two sides of Mundell’s
cost-beneﬁt comparison. In particular, improved sticky price models permit a formalization of
Mundell’s analysis of the welfare gains of enhancing macroeconomic adjustment.1 On the other hand,
comparatively little work has been done on the second of the two parts of the tradeoff – the costs of
exchange rate risk. Only recently have a small number of highly important papers begun to consider
the costs of exchange rate risk in the context of the improved sticky price models, including Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2001), Devereux and Engel (2000), and Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2000).2
While offering tantalizing theoretical results, this literature has been limited to examining only the
simplest of economic settings, as numerous simplifying assumptions are required to permit analytical
solutions. For example, the papers noted above either assumed complete asset markets or special
preferences that made the asset market redundant. As a result, shocks to the exchange rate can have no
effects on the current account or on the net wealth of a country. While such simpliﬁcations have been
necessary for model solution, they obscure factors that clearly may be important for evaluating the
welfare effects of exchange rate volatility. For instance, it traditionally has been thought that among
the most important implications of exchange rate movements are their effect on trade ﬂows and the
1 See Lane (2001) for a survey of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature.
2 For a sample of other work looking at welfare analysis in micro-founded models, see Benigno (2000), Benigno and
Benigno (2001), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a,b), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), Sutherland
(2001).
1current account. Further, if exchange rate movements affect countries asymmetrically, shifts in wealth
between countries may have large effects on welfare.
This paper explores the effects of uncertainty in a general macro model that does not need to
impose the simplifying assumptions discussed above. Most importantly, it will consider a two-country
general equilibrium model in which asset markets are incomplete and preferences are calibrated more
realistically. In addition, it includes investment in real capital and multiperiod price stickiness. As
a result, the ﬁrst contribution of the paper is that it can perform a quantitative analysis. Assigning
a value to these welfare costs is essential if the policy implications of this literature are to be taken
seriously. This is especially a concern, since work by Lucas (1987) has shown that variability of the
type implied by business cycles tend to have very small welfare effects, and the same indictment
might apply to this literature. The second contribution of the paper is that it uncovers and explores a
number of conceptually interesting new costs associated with exchange rate variability, of types not
identiﬁed in past literature.
Thismore general analysisis madepossible bya solution algorithmcreated recently by Christopher
Sims which can deal with second-order approximations to the equilibrium conditions of stochastic
models.3 In time, these techniques are likely to replace the currently dominant solution methods based
on log-linear approximation, but they are at an early stage of development. This project will be an
early application, helping to demonstrate how these powerful new methods can be usefully employed
in international economics.4
The calibration exercise ﬁnds that the welfare effects of uncertainty are likely to be small for a
wide range of cases. Even when the model incorporates the model features most emphasized by past
theoretical work, they tend to imply welfare costs around only one tenth of one percent of annual
steady state consumption. While the theoretical literature has emphasized certain model features in
3 See Sims (2000) and Kim, et al (2002). Related solution algorithms have been proposed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2001), and Collard and Juillard (2001).
4 This paper is related to Kollmann (2002a,b), which has adapted the Sims algorithm. Kollmann puts his model to a
different use, ﬁnding optimal monetary policy rules and examining policy coordination, rather than examining cases where
exchange rate risk is quantitativlely signiﬁcant. Recently, Benigno (2001) has explored a two-country model where asset
markets are incomplete. But his solution method does not allow him to solve for the welfare of countries individually; he
can only consider the world aggregate, where there is no change in net assets.
2its debates – such as pricing to market and substitutability between consumption and leisure – the
exercise here indicates that these issues are not quantitatively signiﬁcant in general.
However, the paper uncovers other features of the economy, ignored in the literature to date, which
do seem to be important in a quantitative sense. One such case is where households exhibit habit
persistence in consumption. This speciﬁcation stipulates that utility is strongly affected by sudden
consumption changes, and so it naturally ampliﬁes the welfare effects of the risk of shocks that would
require such changes. Habits have been found to be important for understanding household behavior
in domestic equity markets, so if this behavior applies to international markets as well, it appears to
imply exchange rate risk in fact may be quite costly.
Another case where risk has large welfare effects is where asset markets are asymmetric. In
particular, if there is an international market for bonds in the currency of only one of the two countries,
this country will tend to save more and have higher welfare in the stochastic steady state. But this
effect comes at the direct expense of the other country, which saves less and has lower welfare in
steady state. This asymmetry exists because saving in the international bond is a better hedge against
exchange rate risk for a country that can save in terms of its own currency. This result indicates that
the gains to countries like the U.S. or members of the euro zone, which host a reserve currency, may
be substantial.
The paper then considers how these welfare costs might be offset. A government policy to ﬁx the
exchange rate is one possibility. Another is the fact that private markets allow for various assets like
forward contracts to hedge against exchange rate risk. It appears that this paper is the ﬁrst to analyze
forward contracts in the context of a general equilibrium model of this type. The paper ﬁnds that the
effectiveness of these private measures depends crucially upon which elements in the economy are
generating the large welfare costs.
The next section of the paper presents the two-country model, calibration, and solution method.
Section 3 presents results for a range of cases for this model. Section 4 concludes and makes
suggestions for future research.
32 The Model
Consider a model of two countries, hereafter referred to as home and foreign. Suppose agents
consume two ﬁnal goods, where each country specializes in the production of one of these goods.
Monopolistically competitive ﬁrms produce intermediate goods using capital and labor, and set prices
sluggishly due to adjustment costs.
2.1 Goods Market structure
Final goods in this economy (F) are a CES index over sub-indexes of the home and foreign



































Here FH represents an aggregate of the home goods sold in the home country, and FF is an aggregate
of the imported foreign goods, where lower case counterparts represent outputs of the individual ﬁrms.
Final goods producers behave competitively, maximizing proﬁt each period:
πt = max [PtFt − PH,tFH,t − PF,tFF,t], (4)
where P is the overall price index of the ﬁnal good, PH is the price index of home goods, and PF is


























and where lower case counterparts again represent the prices set by individual ﬁrms.



























We have analogous deﬁnitions for the foreign country.
2.2 Home household problem
The representative home household derives utility from consumption (C), real money balances (M
P ),
and labor (H). Households derive income by selling their labor (H) at the nominal wage rate (W),
renting out capital to ﬁrms at the real rental rate (r), receiving real proﬁts from home ﬁrms (Π), and
from government transfers (T). In addition to money, households can hold a noncontingent nominal
bond denominated in home currency (BH) which pays an interest rate (i), or a bond denominated
in foreign currency (BF) which pays an interest rate (i∗). The household determines capital
accumulation (K), which involves a quadratic adjustment cost that depends upon the parameter ψI
and a constant rate of depreciation (δ).








subject to the budget constraint:
PtCt + Pt (Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt)+ACI,t + Mt + BH,t + StBF,t + ACB,t =( 1+it−1)BH,t−1
+St(1 + i∗






































Money demand shocks are represented by shifts in χt. There is a small adjustment cost on bond
holdings, ACB, to ensure stationarity in the net foreign asset position.5










(1 − dt)1/ε, (14)















































































equating the beneﬁts and costs of capital accumulation. The beneﬁts on the right of the equation
above include the return from rental of the capital plus the resale value after depreciation, as well as
the last term, representing the fact that accumulating a larger capital stock today lowers the expected
adjustment cost of further accumulation in the future. Analogous conditions apply to the foreign
household.
5 Home and foreign bonds are treated separately in this adjustment cost to ensure that there exists a determinate allocation
between home and foreign currency bonds even in a ﬁrst-order approximation to the system, as is required by the
second-order accurate solution of Sims (2000).
62.3 Home ﬁrm problem
In the benchmark version of the model we assume producer currency pricing, so that ﬁrms set prices
in their own currency both for sales domestically and sales abroad. They rent capital (K)a tt h er e n t a l
rate r, and hire labor (H) at the nominal rate W. Prices are sticky because there is a quadratic cost to






ΠH,t(i) =( PH,t(i) − MCt(i) − ACP,t(i))fH,t(i), (21)











θtαα(1 − α)1−α (23)
and subject to the demand function for fH,t(i) from above and the production function specifying




Here θ represents technology common to all production ﬁrms in the country, and is subject to
shocks. Lastly, ρt,t+n is the pricing kernel used to value random date t + n payoffs. Since ﬁrms are
assumed to to be owned by the representative household, it is also assumed that ﬁrms value future
proﬁts according to the household’s intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption,










,w h e r eU0
C,t+n is the household’s marginal utility of
consumption in period t + n. The optimization problem implies a trade-off between capital and labor





6 It has been demonstrated in Rotemberg (1982) that menu costs of this type, although simple to specify and work with,
generate price dynamics identical to those of Calvo random price staggering


































Note that in the special case of no price stickiness (ψP =0 ), price-setting is set as a simple markup
over marginal costs: pHt = λ
λ−1MCt. But in the presence of price adjustment costs, price-setting will
deviate from this simple markup because of several additional terms. First, the resource cost of setting
ap r i c e( ACP) should be included along with the cost of production when computing the overall price
of bringing a good to market. The next term in the expression above reﬂects the backward looking
component of price setting: ﬁrms are reluctant to make large changes in price due to the marginal
adjustment cost. The ﬁnal term reﬂects the forward-looking component of price setting. If a ﬁrm
expects the need to change prices further in the next period, it will tend to change the price more
today, to minimize future adjustment costs. Further, there is an additional reason to raise prices today,
because a higher current price means that any future changes will be a smaller percentage change.
Here we see one reason for the monopolist to set a higher price on average, as a hedge against future
price changes.
Price stickiness generated through adjustment costs in this matter is different from the Calvo
pricing most common in the literature, but it has distinct advantages. Perhaps the most important
is that it allows all ﬁrms to reset prices if the costs of price stickiness become large. Under Calvo
pricing, some ﬁrms are forced to retain prices arbitrarily far away from the optimal price, which can
inﬂuence the welfare implications in a way viewed by some as unreasonable.
The optimal price for the foreign market will be:
p∗
H,t = pH,t/St (27)




To facilitate comparison with the earlier literature (Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), Devereux and Engel
(2000), and Bacchetta and Van Wincoop (2000)), we follow them in using a money growth rule:
mt = mt−1 + aS (st − s)( 28)
where lower case letters represent logs of upper case counterparts. This rule will permit a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime, for aS set to a large negative value, or alternatively a ﬂexible exchange rate
regime, for a value of aS set near zero. For most experiments the parameter aS will be set to a value
near but not exactly zero, which allows wide exchange rate variability but rules out a random walk in
the exchange rate. The fact that the exchange rate is stationary allows us to examine this key variable
of interest in our model simulations in nominal form, without transforming it to a real exchange rate.




(Mt − Mt−1)( 29)
2.5 Market clearing and equilibrium
Market clearing for the home goods market requires:
FHt + F∗
Ht = Yt, (30)
and for the home bond market:
BH,t + B∗
H,t =0 . (31)
Total home demand (F) may be deﬁned:








− PH,tYt + PtCt + Pt (Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt)=0 ( 33)
Equilibrium is a set of 39 equations determining 39 sequences: Ct,C ∗




t ,S t,W t,W∗













t ,i t,i ∗
t. The 39 equilibrium conditions are: the deﬁnition of
total demand (1), demand conditions for home and foreign goods (8 and 9), the overall price index
(5), the price setting rules (26) and (27), the money supply rule (28), labor supply condition (15),
capital-labor trade-off (25), money demand condition (14), the interest rate parity condition (18),
production function (24), deﬁnition of marginal cost (23),deﬁnition of total demand (32), deﬁnition of
d (17), consumption Euler equation (16), market clearing conditions for goods (30) and bonds (31),
capital accumulation (19), along with foreign counterparts for each of the above and the balance of
payments constraint (33).







































To deal with the nonstationary nominal variables in this system, they will be transformed by
dividing by their respective national price level. As noted above, this does not need to be done for the
nominal exchange rate.
2.6 Solution method
The model is solved numerically to a second order approximation. This stands in contrast to the
standard method relying upon log-linear approximations, which would miss many of the implications
of risk. In the present context, such a method would only capture the direct effects of exchange rate
variability on welfare through the fact that people dislike variance in consumption and leisure. It
ignores the fact that variability in the exchange rate can have important effects on welfare through
the means of variables. For example, if ﬁrms respond to exchange rate variability by producing less
output, the level of consumption will be lower, and this effect on means will affect welfare. Further, if
households respond to variability by precautionary saving, this rise in wealth potentially may make
welfare rise rather than fall . Woodford (2002) has demonstrated in the context of a closed economy
10model that under certain simplifying assumptions, these mean effects will not impact welfare, and
this solution approach has been employed in open economy contexts by several papers. But Benigno
(2001) has shown that for this result to hold in an open economy requires many additional simplifying
assumptions, such as restrictive preference speciﬁcations. In a general setting, the effects of risk
working through means of variables may well be equally or more important for welfare than those
effects working through variances.
The method used here is the second-order accurate solution by Sims (2000) and Kim et al. (2002).
Here we present only the basic relationships. If one denotes by η the vector of all endogenous and
exogenous variables, then the solution algorithm requires that the system is written in the following
way
Ψ(ηt,ηt−1,εt)+Π%t = c, (35)
where εt is the vector of shocks (in our case two technology and two money demand shocks) to
the system and %t is a function of the shocks when the model is solved. We expand the model to a
second-order around a steady state given by:
Ψ(¯ η,¯ η,0).
The solution, then, is given by:
yt = F(yt−1,εt), (36)
xt = M(yt), (37)
where yt and xt can be interpreted in the usual sense as the predetermined and forward-looking
variables, respectively, and [y0
t x0
t]=Z0ηt. The second-order expansion of the solution can be written
as




(F11ijkdyj,t−1dyk,t−1 +2 F12ijkdyj,t−1εkt + F22ijkεjtεkt),
dxit = M11ijkdyjtdykt + M2iσ2,
where the matrices Z,F and M are functions of the model parameters. Note as well that, in
11accordance with Sims [2000], we are using tensor notation, i.e. it is true that:




Taking unconditional expectations of (38) and making use of [y0
t x0
t]=Z0ηt, it is possible to compute
the following unconditional ﬁrst and second moments of the system:
E[dηtdη0
t] and E[dηt]. (39)
In this computation we disregard those terms that are higher than second order.
2.7 Computation of the welfare measure
The objective here is to compare alternative steady states of the model, one with risk and the other
without.7 In accord with this speciﬁc objective, we compute welfare measures as the unconditional
expectation of utility in steady state. A second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function yields:
EUt = ¯ U + ¯ C1−ρE( ˆ Ct) −
1
2
ρ ¯ C1−ρvar( ˆ Ct) − ¯ H1+ψE( b Ht) −
1
2
ψ ¯ H1+ψvar( ˆ Ht). (40)
We follow Lucas (1987) in that we represent them as the permanent shift in steady state consumption
required to achieve the same expected utility, i.e. we ﬁnd how much steady state consumption the
household is ready to give up in order to negate the effect of the shocks. Since we use a second-order
approximation, however, we can go even further. We can separate the effects of a particular shock
to the dynamic system. The shock matters because it inﬂuences the expected levels of the variables
and because it has a bearing on the their second moments. While the latter can be found relatively
easily from a ﬁrst-order solution, the former can be gleaned only from a full second-order expansion
of the model. Let umean denote the permanent shift in steady state consumption that delivers the same
expected utility. Then, making use of (40) we must have that
U ((1 +umean)C,H)=





= ¯ U + ¯ C1−ρE( ˆ Ct) − ¯ H1+ψE( ˆ Ht). (41)
7 We agree that for experiments that consider the welfare effects of implementing alternative policies, conditional welfare
is more appropriate, which would consider the discounted path of utility during transition to the new steady state. However,
such an experiment is not the objective here.
12Solving for umean we get:
umean =
·
1+( 1− ρ)E( ˆ Ct) −
(1 − ρ) ¯ H1+ψ




In a similar fashion we derive uvar which denotes the permanent shift in steady state consumption
associated with the effect of the shocks on the variances of the variables. We ﬁnd that:
U ((1 +uvar)C,H)=





= ¯ U −ρ ¯ C1−ρvar( ˆ Ct)−ψ ¯ H1+ψvar( ˆ Ht). (43)
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The values for umean and uvar reported in Table 2 are coming from these calculations.
2.8 Calibration
In the benchmark case of the model we choose the following parameterization. Empirical studies ﬁnd
a wide range of estimates for the interest elasticity of real money balances (1/²), and we follow Bergin
and Feenstra (2001) in choosing an intermediate value of 0.25 (² =4 ). Empirical studies estimate the
income elasticity of real money demand (ρ/²) to be about unity, so we also set ρ =4 . This is in the
range of the estimates for the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion provided by Hall (1988) (as low as 1
and as high as 33) and also by Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2002) who suggest a value between 3
and 10.
The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods µ is a critical parameter in our
experiments. According to some recent studies , such as Harrigan (1993) and Treﬂer and Lai (1999),
a sensible assumption for this parameter is 5, and we follow this parameterization. Rotemberg
and Woodford (1998) set the degree of monopolistic competition λ to be 7.66 which implies an
average price mark-up of 15%. We choose λ =7 . The share of home goods in the home ﬁnal goods
aggregator, a, is set at 0.80, reﬂecting the 20% share of imports in GDP on average for the G7
countries in the 1990:1-1998:4 period.
The speciﬁcation of the utility function has the convenient feature that the household has a
well-deﬁned static labor supply function, whose elasticity, 1/ψ, is constant. The value for this
13elasticity is controversial. Microeconomic studies (for example, Killingsworth and Heckman (1986))
suggest values between 0.5-1.5. We follow Christiano at. al. (1997) and set ψ =1 . A unitary labor
supply elasticity is consistent with the fact that per-capita labor supply has changed little while real
wages have risen in recent decades. We calibrate β =0 .99 and interpret a period in the model as
one quarter. For the depreciation rate we choose δ =0 .025, and for the capital share in production
α =0 .36.
The price adjustment cost is set at ψP =5 0 , which implies that 95% of the price has adjusted 4
periods after a monetary shock. Investment adjustment cost, ψI =4 , is calibrated such that investment
is about three times more volatile than output. Bond adjustment cost, ψB =0 .000004, is necessary
in order to negate the unit root associated with the incompleteness of the asset markets. We need the
monetary policy reaction parameters aS =1 x10−6 in order to eliminate the unit root in the monetary
policy rule. It is crucial that the ﬁrst-order solution does not contain unit roots, because, otherwise, in
the second-order solution the variances of the variables will grow to inﬁnity.
The variance and persistence of the technology shock is calibrated at standard values:
var(ε1)=var(ε∗
1)=.012 and ρ1 = ρ∗
1 =0 .90, common values in the real business cycle literature
and identical to Kollmann (2002a). As will be seen in Table 2, these values help us to replicate the
second moments of output, which we compute to be 1.80 for the 1973:1-2000:4 period in HP-ﬁltered
GDP data for the G7 countries on average. We calibrate the money demand shocks to help us replicate
the observed second moments of the nominal exchange rate. We ﬁnd that the bilateral exchange rate
with the U.S. dollar of the remaining G7 countries on average is 7.81 percent for HP-ﬁltered data in
the 1973:1 - 2000:4 period, which is between 4 and 5 times as volatile as output.8 The autoregressive
coefﬁcient indicated by this data is 0.79. Replicating these features requires the following values for
the money demand shocks: var(ε2)=var(ε∗
2)=0 .032 and ρ2 = ρ∗
2 =0 .99. For simplicity we
assume that shocks are uncorrelated with each other.
8 This value for exchange rate volatility is standard in quantitative business cycle studies, as in Chari et al. (1998) and
in Kollmann (2002). We also considered geometrically detrending the data, even though this still leaves a unit root in the
data. The standard deviation of the exchange rate then rises to 15 percent, and results of the model under calibration to this
volatility will be noted later.
143 Results
Table 1 reports a summary of results from a battery of experiments, showing the effect of
uncertainty on welfare, and Tables 2-4 report the details for these experiments. In particular, it reports
the difference between the unconditional mean of utility in the second-order approximation of the
model and that of the certainty-equivalent version of the model. To aid interpretation, this difference
in utilities is presented in terms of the change in the steady state level of consumption that would
be needed to change utility the same amount, as explained in section 2.7 above. As is usual in this
literature, welfare is computed from the portion of the utility function excluding real money balances.
3.1 Benchmark and related cases
The ﬁrst line of Table 1 refers to the benchmark model and calibration described in the section above.
This case may be viewed as a more fully ﬂeshed out version of the benchmark model used in the
theoretical analysis of exchange rate risk in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), where the model here has
been extended to include investment, multiperiod price stickiness, and a more realistic calibration of
parameters like the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods and the money demand
elasticity.
Table 1 shows that the welfare effects of risk in this benchmark case are fairly small, amounting to
a fall in utility equal to 0.14% of steady state consumption. A useful comparison is the result of Lucas
(1987), which measured the effect on welfare of volatility arising from business cycle ﬂuctuations. He
found that the loss in welfare was equivalent to a loss in average consumption of 0.042 percent, and
he concluded that this was a trivial magnitude. The result here is somewhat larger than this, but still of
a similar order of magnitude, and is far below one percent of steady state consumption.
Column 1 of Table 2 shows details behind the result for the benchmark case. First note that the
standard deviations of the key variables in the model match fairly well with the average among G7
economies. Consumption is about 2/3 as volatile as output, investment is about 3 times as volatile,
and the nominal exchange rate is about 4 times as volatile as output. The fall in overall welfare seems
15to be coming from the fact that the steady state level of consumption and production are lower under
risk. This in part is due to the higher markup of the home goods price over marginal cost shown in the
table. This reﬂects the theoretical ﬁnding in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) that risk averse ﬁrms will
tend to set higher prices and restrict output, to hedge against uncertainty. Note also that the trade
volume is higher under the presence of risk. While this stands in contrast to the usual presumption
that exchange rate risk inhibits trade, the result found here has been shown to be very feasible in
theoretical exercises, as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000). Lastly, the breakdown of welfare
effects shows that a signiﬁcant fraction comes from changes in the mean variables, not just the fact
that there is extra variability. This portion of the welfare effect would not be picked up by papers
using a second-order approximation only to the utility function; they would miss the fact that welfare
is lower because risk averse ﬁrms restrict production and consumption, and thereby alter the means of
variables in the stochastic steady state.
Some additional experiments can offer further insight into the role of markups here. Recall from
the price setting equation (26) that in the absence of price adjustment costs (ψP =0 ), the markup
ratio of price to marginal cost is a constant, λ
λ−1. Column 2 of Table 2 reports results for such a
case, where prices are fully ﬂexible. Note that the markup value in the table is zero, indicating that
the markup in stochastic steady state stays constant at its value in the deterministic steady state. In
other words, this case factors out the effects of risk found in the benchmark case which are working
through induced increases in the markup. Since (26) is the only place in the model where ψP appears,
the welfare effects attributable to the presence of price stickiness here are equivalent to the effects
working though additional markups.9 About half of the overall welfare effect found in column 1 is
now eliminated, so this appears to be the portion that is attributable to markups and sticky prices. To
be precise, markups account for a fall in welfare of 0.0644 (taking the difference between the two
columns). It is worth noting that eliminating price stickiness produces results very similar to what is
found when one considers the experiment of eliminating money demand shocks from the model and
9 There is no beneﬁt from implementing a tax a-la Woodford (2002) to offset the monopolistic distortion in deterministic
steady state. In experiments we conﬁrm that this only affects the deterministic steady state and not the gap between
stochastic and deterministic steady states, so it has no effect on the values reported in the tables.
16just permitting technology shocks to operate.
Much recent work in open economy macroeconomics has explored price stickiness in the local
currency of the buyer (LCP) rather than the domestic currency of the producer (PCP) as assumed
above. Devereux and Engel (2001) have demonstrated in an analytically solvable model that this
distinction can alter the welfare effects of ﬂexible exchange rates. Line 2 of Table 1 explores this
variation on the benchmark model. This model may be regarded as a version of that used in Devereux
and Engel (2001) expanded to a more realistic setting, to include investment, multiperiod price
stickiness, incomplete asset markets, and more realistic parameter values as above. While LCP may
make a distinction theoretically, line 2 of the table indicates that this distinction may not be signiﬁcant
quantitatively. The welfare effect of risk remains small, and is even a bit smaller than under the PCP
benchmark speciﬁcation. (See column 3 of Table 2 for more detailed results.)
Work by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) also analyzed the effects of exchange rate risk in
an analytically solvable model. In their case, they emphasized the role of substitutability between
consumption and leisure in altering the effects of exchange rate risk. We address this issue by
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The parameter b is calibrated so that the steady state share of time to labor is 0.37, and φ is adjusted to
replicate the consumption-leisure substitutabilities considered in Bacchetta and van Wincoop, so φ is
set at 0.1 and 10 for complements and substitutes respectively. Again, our more general model differs
from theirs in the factors discussed above, and also in the fact that their model was not dynamic,
and did not include technology shocks. The welfare effects again are small. Further, the signs of
the effects are different from that found in the earlier paper: the case with complements has a lower
welfare than the case with substitutes. More detailed results, found in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2,
indicate that the trade volume is raised by risk in both cases, although this effect is larger in the case
10 This utility differs from Bachetta and van Wincoop (2000) in that it includes money. Note that this utility differs from
that used earlier in the paper in the way it includes labor, so that it does not collapse down to equation (12)i fw ea s s u m e
a zero elasticity of substitution. Also note that the change in utility function requires a corresponding adjustment in the
computation of u
mean and u
var in evaluating welfare effects.
17of complements.
3.2 Sensitivity analysis
The three earlier papers cited above rely on a number of model simpliﬁcations and parameter
assumptions to facilitate analytical solutions of their models. We check here what role is played by
these simplifying assumptions and the fact that we relax them.
First, two of the three papers highlighted above assume a particular market structure, with
Cobb-Douglas preferences that imply a unitary elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods. This assumption promotes risk sharing between the countries and greatly simpliﬁes the
solution in certain cases. Recall that our benchmark case calibrated this elasticity at the value of 5, as
suggested by empirical literature. Line 6 of Table 1 shows the result if we set this parameter to unity,
indicating that there is very little effect on the outcome. It may not be surprising that the lack of
risk sharing is not important for our benchmark case, given that the welfare effects appear to be quite
symmetric across countries. This will not be true for some experiments to come.
The models solved analytically typically must take an approximation to the money demand
function, which is exact only under the assumption of a unitary elasticity of money demand. Our
benchmark model assumed the empirically more relevant value of 1/4, but line 7 of Table 1 shows that
results are little changed if we were to use a value of unity.11
Line 8 considers if we had a model with no investment. Again the results are little changed.
We also consider some parameter values that might be expected to raise the magnitude of the very
small welfare effects we are ﬁnding here. One possibility is that exchange rate variability would
matter more for countries that trade more with foreign countries. Line 9 of the table shows a case
where the share of imports in GDP (1 − a) is raised from 0.2 to 0.5. This makes little difference.
It is also possible that risk would matter if agents were more risk averse. Line 10 shows a
case where the risk aversion parameter (ρ) is set at 30 instead of 4. Again there is little effect. It
11 The experiment with unitary demand elasticity required that the variance of the money demand shock be lowered to
var(ε2)=0 .0075
2, for the model to continue to replicate the exchange rate variability observed in the data. In the no
investment case to follow, a variance of 0.01
2 was required, and the case with increased risk aversion required a variance of
0.08
2.
18appears that a wide range of cases of the two-country model imply that the welfare effects of risk are
quantitatively small.
3.3 Habit persistence
Another way of enhancing the risk aversion of households is to consider preferences that exhibit
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As γ goes to unity, households act to smooth changes in consumption rather than the level of
consumption. Habit persistence has been used extensively to explain ﬁnancial anomalies such as the
equity premium puzzle, and has been advocated in the macroeconomic literature as a way of better
capturing consumer behavior. 12 Given that this literature has found households to be sensitive to risk
in equity markets, one might also expect them to be sensitive to risk in foreign exchange markets. In
particular, one might expect risk to have larger welfare effects here, as these consumers dislike large
a n dr a p i dc u t si nc o n s u m p t i o n ,a n ds ot h e ya r em o r es e n s i t i v et oc o n s u m p t i o nr i s kt h a na g e n t sw i t h
time-separable utility. We calibrate the habit persistence parameter at γ =0 .8, which is approximately
what Deaton (1987) and Constantinides (1990) require in order to explain aggregate consumption
smoothness and the equity premium puzzle.
It is common in calibrating habit persistence models to impose a large investment adjustment
cost to keep the standard deviation of consumption from falling too low. This device does not work
in an open economy where households can borrow abroad, because there no longer exists a direct
connection between domestic investment and saving. Instead we augment the bond adjustment cost
12 See for example Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) regarding the equity premium puzzle, and
see Deaton (1987) and Fuhrer (2000) for a discussion in the context of consumption behavior.




















where ψB2 is calibrated at 0.000004.
Line 11 of Table 1 shows that welfare now falls a signiﬁcant amount due to risk. In particular,
households would be willing to trade 4.6% of annual steady state consumption to eliminate this
risk, which is more than an order of magnitude larger than the results found in previous cases.13
Table 3 shows details. Surprisingly, the levels of model variables change very little due to risk here.
Nevertheless the welfare of households falls signiﬁcantly, both because of the changes in variance
and means, when measured in terms of steady state consumption. This may be explained by the fact
that under habit persistence, households do not care much about steady state levels of consumption
but rather about changes in consumption between periods, so that a large amount of steady state
consumption must be used to compensate for lost welfare.14
It is worthwhile asking the question how much of the welfare loss due to risk here is attributable
to exchange rate risk in particular? While studies using analytical solutions can answer this question
easily by looking at the role of the exchange rate variance term in the analytical expression for
welfare, this is not possible here. One way to try to extract the effect of exchange rate variability
here is to compare the results of our model with a version that assumes a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
This amounts to setting the parameter in the monetary policy rule, aS, equal to a large value for
both countries. Line 12 of Table 1 indicates that the welfare loss falls by about one-third. Column 2
of Table 3 indicates that the standard deviations of the other variables in the model have remained
constant: the variability of output and consumption are virtually unchanged, and it is only the
13 Note that with a different utility function, the formulas for computing u
mean and u
var must be altered accordingly.
14 Just to conﬁrm that the large welfare effects here are not arising from grossly sub-optimal policy behavior, we
compute an optimal policy rule for steady state under a Nash equilibrium. The policy rule was speciﬁed to permit
responses to shocks but not a direct response to the exchange rate other than that needed for dynamic stability:
mt = mt−1 + a1θt + a2θ
∗




s ,w h e r eas was speciﬁed as 1x10
−6 as previously. The optimal
policy parameters converged to a1 =0 .1219, a2 = −0.0296, a3 =0 .0033,a n da4 = −0.0004. While the signs of
these coefﬁcients coincide with those found in the simpler model of Devereux and Engel (2000), they are much smaller
in magnitude. In fact, the welfare under the optimized rule improves only from -4.554 to -4.544 percent of steady state
consumption. This indicates that the large welfare effects found here are not simply due to a suboptimal policy rule.
20variability of the exchange rate that has been eliminated from the model. This suggests that about
one third of the welfare loss in the habit persistence case is due to exchange rate risk. Note that this
experiment properly should not be regarded as a comparison of ﬂexible versus ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes, as the ﬂexible case we consider was not an optimal policy rule.
One important means by which private markets have evolved to combat exchange rate risk is the
use of forward exchange contracts. It is next worth asking to what degree such private markets can
offset the welfare effects found here. Forward contracts are introduced into the model as assets FH
that can be purchased in foreign currency but pay off in home currency at a pre-determned exchange
rate, fH; likewise assets FF can be purchased in home currency that pay off in foreign currency units
at a predetermined exchange rate fF. The home household budget constraint then becomes:
PtCt + Pt(Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt)+ACI,t + Mt + BH,t + StBF,t + FH,t + StFF,t + ACB,t
=( 1+it−1)BH,t−1 + St(1 +i∗
t−1)BF,t−1 + St
fH,t−1(1 + it−1)FH,t−1
+fF,t−1(1 + it−1)FF,t−1 + Mt−1 + WtHt + PtrtKt + Tt + Πt
(48)
where the adjustment cost is augmented to include all four interest bearing assets. The six new
variables for home and foreign ( FH,F∗
H,f H, FF,F∗
F,and fF) are determined by two market clearing
conditions and four new ﬁrst order conditions, including covered interest rate parity conditions. Line
13 of Table 1 shows that forward contracts can offset only about 10% of the welfare costs of risk in
the ﬂexible exchange rate case. This is signiﬁcantly smaller than the welfare improvements achieved
by using monetary policy to eliminate all exchange rate variability.
3.4 Asymmetric asset market
T h es p e c i ﬁ c a t i o no fa s s e tm a r k e t sc a na l s om a k ead i f f e r e n c ef o rw e l f a r ee f f e c t s .C o n s i d e rac a s e
where there is only one nominal bond that is traded internationally, denominated in the currency of the
home country. This implies the benchmark model above, except that BFti ss e tt oz e r oi na l lp e r i o d s .
This version of the model is arguably quite relevant for a large number of countries in the world. The
home country in our model certainly is relevant for those countries whose currencies have the status
of reserve currencies, such as the U.S., Japan, and now EMU countries. And the foreign country in the
model is relevant essentially for the other countries in the world, who do not enjoy reserve currency
21status.
Looking at line 14 in Table 1, this asymmetry in asset markets implies that risk has a fair-sized
impact on welfare of the two countries.15 While the foreign country’s welfare is hurt by the presence
of risk, the home country actually beneﬁts. The effect is not as large as that found for the habit
persistence case above, but it is signiﬁcantly larger than for the benchmark case, especially for the
foreign country. Part of the magnitude of welfare effects here is obscured by the fact that the effects
of monetary shocks and technology shocks work in offsetting directions for each country. If one
considers just the effects of monetary shocks alone, risk raises welfare by 1.07% at home and lowers
foreign welfare by approximately the same amount. In other words, welfare effects here can exceed
one full percent of steady state consumption, which is an order of magnitude larger than the case
reported in rows 1-10 in the table. Table 4 indicates that the large majority of this effect comes from
a change in the mean value of variables rather than the variances. In particular there is a rise in the
mean of home consumption and a fall in foreign. Clearly the asymmetry of this result distinguishes
it from the analytical models used in previous studies, examined in the beginning of this paper.
The simplifying features of those models implied that risks were perfectly pooled between the two
countries, so no asymmetry was possible.16
The logic for what happens in this case of asymmetric incomplete markets is as follows. The
introduction of risk makes households want to engage in precautionary saving to hedge. But since this
is true for both countries, the main effect is to make the world interest rate on the bond fall, as can be
seen clearly in the more detailed set of results in column 3 of Table 4. Since the international asset is
in the currency of the home country, the exchange rate risk makes it a less attractive instrument for
saving for the foreign country than for the home country. Given the fall in the interest rate, the foreign
country chooses to save less in equilibrium, while the home country saves more. This rise in home net
foreign asset position is also reﬂected clearly in column 3 of Table 4. So the home country has greater
15 For the model to continue producing the same level of exchange rate variability under this speciﬁcation, the variance of
the money demand shock needed to be increased somewhat from 0.03
2 to 0.05
2.
16 It was not possible to compute an optimal policy rule for a Nash equilibrium here. It is always in the interest of one
country to dampen exchange rate movements, while it is always in the interest of the other to undo this policy to amplify
exchange rate volatility. As a result, there is no convergence in the pair of optimal policy rules.
22wealth and hence greater consumption in steady state than the foreign country.17 See the appendix for
a more detailed derivation of these points.
Line 15 shows the ﬁxed exchange rate speciﬁcation applied to the asymmetric asset markets case.
The majority of the welfare effects are eliminated, and virtually all of the large effects associated with
monetary shocks noted above disappear. This is true, while the standard deviations in Table 4 indicate
there is virtually no change at all in the model’s implications other than the elimination of exchange
rate volatility. It appears that exchange rate risk is an essential element of the welfare costs here.
Further, these welfare costs can in large part be eliminated if forward contracts are traded, as shown in
line 16. In contrast to the habit persistence case, it appears that if welfare loss is due to the inability of
countries without reserve currencies to hedge effectively against exchange rate risk, private markets
can effectively solve this problem by the creation of other assets to serve this hedging function.
4 Conclusions
The paper has examined quantitatively the welfare effects of exchange rate risk in a two country
model. The ﬁrst conclusion is that the welfare effects are likely to be small for a wide range of cases.
This certainly appears to be true for the special cases considered in most of the previous literature,
where a reasonable calibration indicates welfare costs around only one tenth of one percent of annual
steady state consumption. While the model features and issues debated in this earlier literature do
have effects on welfare, such as pricing to market and substitutability between consumption and
leisure, our exercise indicates that these issues in general are not quantitatively signiﬁcant.
However, the explorations here do ﬁnd at least two plausible cases where risk does matter
quantitatively, lowering welfare in excess of one percent of steady state consumption. One case is
where households exhibit habit persistence in consumption. This speciﬁcation stipulates that utility is
strongly affected by sudden consumption changes, and so it naturally ampliﬁes the welfare effects of
17 This result helps us to better understand and qualify the result in the small open economy model of Kollmann (2002).
Because the model is of a small open economy, the world interest rate is taken as exogenous and is therefore unaffected by
the presence of risk. As a result, the small country saves more and ends up with higher welfare in steady state. Our analysis
shows that when a two-country model takes into consideration the effects of risk on the world environment, the resulting fall
in interest rate reverses the result implied above.
23the risk of shocks that would require such changes.
A second case where risk has large welfare effects is where asset markets are asymmetric. If there
is an international market for bonds in the currency of only one of the two countries, we ﬁnd that
this country will tend to save more and have higher welfare in the stochastic steady state. But this
effect comes at the direct expense of the other country, which saves less and has lower welfare in
steady state. This asymmetry exists because saving in the international bond is a better hedge against
exchange rate risk for a country that can save in terms of its own currency. This result indicates that
gains to countries like the U.S. that host a reserve currency may be substantial.
The paper has also considered how these welfare costs might be offset. A government policy to ﬁx
the exchange rate is one possibility. Another is the fact that private markets allow for various assets
like forward contracts to hedge against exchange rate risk. The paper ﬁnds that the effectiveness of
these private measures depends crucially upon which elements in the economy are generating the
large welfare costs.
This work suggests that attention in the theoretical literature could proﬁtably be shifted away
from examining features of the economy that seem not to matter quantitatively, and we point out at
least two new areas that should receive attention in this literature: habit persistence and asymmetric
asset markets. In particular, a comparison of ﬁxed versus optimal ﬂexible exchange rate rules should
be examined under these two cases. Further, our results suggest that there may be other ways of
generating asymmetries between countries as yet unexplored that could be quantitatively important
for welfare.
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26Appendix: Asymmetric Asset Market Case
One can gain some insight into the mechanism described in the text for the asymmetric assets
markets case by comparing the intertemporal Euler equations across countries. The consumption



















































































































A hat over a variable denotes a log deviation from its deterministic steady state. Since bonds are
a s s u m e dt ob ez e r oi ns t e a d ys t a t e ,dBh∗
t stands for the absolute deviation of bond holdings from
zero. The last expression is crucial in our analysis because it demonstrates the relationship between
the expected holdings of home bonds by the foreign country and the variability of the exchange
rate.18 This can be seen more clearly by further expanding q
f
t (using a second-order Taylor-series









t+1.T h e n E(b q
f
t ) − E(b qh
t ) will be equal to:
E(b q
f
t ) − E(b qh
t )=var(b St) − cov(b St, b St+1)+cov(b St, b q∗
t) − cov(b St+1, b q∗
t)( 54)
18 Note that among the three terms on the right hand side of the equality, the last term will be quantitatively insigniﬁcant in
comparison with the others, as it is scaled by the adjustment cost parameter, ψB, which is calibrated to be very small.
27where we have made use of the fact that the unconditional expectations of b St andb St+1,a n db q∗
t and
b qh
t are the same. Looking at (54) it is clear that an increase in the variance of the exchange rate
in isolation would tend to make the foreign country save more by investing in the home-currency
bond. This is so because the variability of the exchange rate makes the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution regarding foreign currency (q
f
t ) higher. Moreover, it is always true that
³
var(b St) − cov(b St, b St+1)
´
> 0 since var(b St)=var(b St+1). If this were the whole effect then
we could have safely concluded that in the true (stochastic) steady state, the foreign holdings of
home-currency denominated bonds are positive. However, the covariance terms at the end of the
expression alter this result. In particular, cov(b St, b q∗
t) and cov(b St+1, b q∗
t) are both negative, where the
ﬁrst of these covariances dominates due to the stationarity of the model. Further, this covariance
is sufﬁciently negative that it makes the overall expression E(b q
f
t ) − E(b qh




















t which is the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption between periods
(t +1 )and t. Therefore, one could interpret the covariances between that ratio and the exchange rate
as a risk premium associated with the investing in a foreign currency. As a result of this risk premium,
the foreign agent’s desire to save is less than that of the home agent, and the stochastic steady state
implies a net foreign debt for the foreign country.




1) Benchmark case -0.144 -0.068 -0.076
    (comparable to Obstfeld-Rogoff 2001)
2) Local Currency Pricing Case -0.090 -0.067 -0.023
    (comparable to Devereux-Engel 2001)
3) consumpion-leisure complements ( f= 0.1) -0.185 -0.050 -0.135
    (comparable to Bachetta-van Wincoop 2000)
4) consumpion-leisure substitutes (f = 10) -0.078 -0.016 -0.062
Sensitivity Analysis:
5) Flexible Prices -0.078 0.000 -0.078
6) Unitary elasticity of sub between -0.109 -0.052 -0.057
    home and foreign goods (m=1)
7) Unitary money demand elasticity (e=1) -0.127 -0.051 -0.076
8) No investment case -0.160 -0.061 -0.092
9) Higher import share (a  = 0.5) -0.153 -0.072 -0.082
10) Higher risk aversion (r = 30) -0.147 -0.009 -0.139
Habit Persistence Cases:
11) Basic - Flexible Exchange rate -4.554 -2.106 -1.628
 
12) Fixed Exchange rate -3.133 -0.990 -2.245
13) Forward contracts -4.132 -2.927 -1.355
Asymmetric Asset Market Cases:    
14) Basic - Flexible Exchange rate home: 0.384 1.060 -0.648
  foreign: -0.828 -1.083 0.266
15) Fixed Exchange rate home: 0.012 -0.007 0.020
foreign: -0.434 -0.008 -0.427
16) Forward contracts home: 0.118 -0.017 0.134
foreign: -0.292 -0.014 -0.278
All welfare effects are computed in terms of the change in steady state consumption that would have
the equivalent effect.                 Table 2: Benchmark and Related Cases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benchmark Flexible  LCP Cons.-Leis. Cons.-Leis.
  Prices   Complements Substitutes
Standard deviations:
  consumption 1.24 1.22 1.04 1.04 2.21
  output 1.87 1.37 3.91 2.98 2.47
  investment 5.61 5.00 6.16 6.55 6.34
  exchange rate 8.02 7.45 9.16 8.92 9.03
Stochastic steady state deviations
1:
  consumption -0.036 0.016 -0.053 -0.034 -0.042
  leisure 0.013 0.035 -0.025 -0.008 -0.013
  output -0.015 0.055 -0.041 -0.032 -0.051
  capital stock -0.034 0.118 -0.014 -0.059 -0.144
  interest rate -0.054 -0.031 -0.103 -0.045 -0.100
  markup ratio 0.341 0.000 0.214 0.186 0.439
  net foreign assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
  trade volume 0.301 0.293 0.488 1.406 0.947
Welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption):
2
  u-overall -0.144 -0.078 -0.090 -0.185 -0.078
  u-variance -0.098 -0.071 -0.056 -0.158 -0.088
  u-mean -0.046 -0.008 -0.035 -0.027 0.010
   
1Percent difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state.
2
Difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state,
  shown as a share of deterministic steady state consumption.
Foreign variables are identical to home in the cases shown here.                         Table 3: Habit Persistence Cases
   
(1) (2) (3)
Flexible Fixed  Forward
Exch. Rate Exch. Rate Contracts
Standard deviations:
  consumption 1.19 1.18 1.18
  output 1.63 1.60 1.64
  investment 5.54 3.91 5.63
  exchange rate 8.00 0.00 7.45
Stochastic steady state deviations
1:
  consumption -0.019 -0.007 -0.008
  leisure 0.035 0.025 0.016
  output 0.008 0.015 0.004
  capital stock 0.072 0.112 0.075
  interest rate -0.039 -0.028 -0.042
  price markup 0.250 0.137 0.241
  net foreign assets 0.000 0.000 0.000
  trade volume 0.067 0.070 0.068
Welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption):
2
  u-overall -4.554 -3.133 -4.133
  u-variance -2.769 -1.800 -3.318
  u-mean -1.991 -1.443 -0.931
1Percent difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state.
2
Difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state,
  shown as a share of deterministic steady state consumption.
Foreign variables are identical to home in the cases shown here.                    Table 4: Asymmetric Asset Market Cases
   
(1) (2) (3)
Flexible Fixed  Forward
Exch. Rate Exch. Rate Contracts
Standard deviations:
  consumption 1.29 1.30 1.12
  output 1.77 1.78 1.08
  investment 5.89 5.89 5.44
  exchange rate 8.58 0.00 7.00
Stochastic steady state deviations
1:
  consumption (home) 0.192 0.092 0.068
  consumption (foreign) -0.175 -0.043 -0.057
  leisure (home) -0.505 -0.134 -0.162
  leisure (foreign) 0.658 0.294 0.225
  output (home) -0.509 -0.148 -0.156
  output (foreign) 0.562 0.247 0.198
  capital stock (home) -0.478 -0.148 -0.418
  capital stock (foreign) 0.379 0.167 0.167
  interest rate -0.470 -0.216 -0.084
  price markup 0.146 0.068 0.094
  net foreign assets 74.147 27.416 18.957
  trade volume 0.598 0.326 0.423
Welfare effects (as percentage of steady state consumption):
2
  u-overall (home) 0.384 0.012 0.118
  u-overall (foreign) -0.828 -0.434 -0.292
  u-variance -0.182 -0.178 -0.071
  u-mean (home) 0.570 0.191 0.189
  u-mean (foreign) -0.651 -0.259 -0.292
1Percent difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state.
2
Difference between stochastic steady state and deterministic steady state,
  shown as a share of deterministic steady state consumption.
 